The Assumption Beneath the Theory: A Reflection on Science, Evolution, and Unexamined Belief

Science stands among the greatest achievements of human reason. It has transformed medicine, expanded technological capabilities, and deepened understanding of the natural world. However, the very success of science can give rise to a subtle but significant error: the conflation of scientific method with the entirety of human knowledge. When empirical observation is treated not simply as one form of knowing, but as the only valid path to knowledge, the result is a worldview often referred to as scientism. This is not science, but a philosophical position that assumes all truth must ultimately be reducible to material causes.

Such assumptions become particularly evident in discussions surrounding evolutionary theory and the origin of life. While many aspects of evolutionary theory are well-supported by observation and experimentation, other elements rest not on demonstrated evidence but on prior metaphysical commitments that are rarely examined.

What Evolution Explains

There is broad consensus that living organisms change over time. Species adapt to their environments, and traits that promote survival and reproduction tend to persist through natural selection. These processes, known collectively as microevolution, are directly observable in phenomena such as antibiotic resistance in bacteria, variations in finch beaks, and selective breeding. They are well-supported by empirical data and widely accepted across philosophical and theological perspectives.

It is also reasonable to conclude that such small changes, accumulated over long periods, may lead to the emergence of new species. This process, known as speciation, is plausible. However, when evolutionary theory is extended beyond this observable range to account for the origin of life itself, or the rise of radically more complex organisms, it enters far more speculative territory.

The Limits of Observation

The origin of life remains one of the great unanswered questions of science. Evolutionary theory presupposes the existence of replicating organisms; it does not explain how non-living matter first became alive. The field of abiogenesis seeks to fill this gap, proposing models in which chemical compounds, under certain conditions, give rise to self-replicating systems. While various hypotheses, such as the RNA world hypothesis, are under investigation, none have yet demonstrated the spontaneous emergence of life from non-life under empirically verifiable conditions.

A similar difficulty emerges when attempting to account for the development of complex multicellular organisms from simpler forms. Fossil records and genetic similarities may suggest common ancestry, but these data do not fully explain the emergence of highly integrated systems such as the nervous system, consciousness, or moral reasoning. It is often assumed that these arose gradually through incremental changes, yet there remains little direct evidence demonstrating the viability of such transitions without presupposing the outcome. The assumption that complex features must have evolved naturally is often presented as a conclusion, though it is in fact a premise of the system.

A common defense of materialist evolutionary explanations is the appeal to deep time. Given billions of years, it is argued, even extraordinarily improbable events become likely. While this may be true in some cases, it cannot be assumed universally. Many biological systems appear to require such a precise configuration of parts that the odds of their arising through purely random processes, even with natural selection, remain staggeringly low. The early appearance of life on Earth, within a few hundred million years of planetary cooling, further compresses the timeframe in which such complex systems must have emerged. In some cases, it is not clear that the available time is sufficient to account for the origin and diversification of life through chance and necessity alone. These difficulties do not invalidate evolutionary theory outright, but they do challenge the tendency to treat improbable events as inevitable simply because they are assumed to be natural.

A similar tension arises in discussions of intelligent life elsewhere in the universe. It is often assumed that, given the vast scale of the cosmos, intelligent civilizations must exist. Yet even if this were true, the practical implications are limited. The universe is approximately the same age for all civilizations. The idea that some alien race has advanced so far beyond human civilization as to achieve interstellar travel or communication, despite having, at most, only a few billion more years of development, presumes not just intelligence, but a near-miraculous acceleration of progress. Once again, immense scale and deep time are invoked to justify what remains, in practical terms, exceedingly implausible. The same caution should be applied when invoking time and chance to explain the appearance of life, or the transition from the simple to the staggeringly complex. Probability and time alone do not ensure plausibility, let alone inevitability.

The Hidden Metaphysical Commitment

The underlying issue is not merely a lack of evidence, but the presence of an unexamined philosophical framework. Most scientific inquiry today is conducted under the assumption of methodological naturalism, which restricts acceptable explanations to natural, material causes. As a practical method, this is appropriate for scientific investigation. However, it becomes problematic when elevated from a methodological approach to a metaphysical claim, namely, that only material causes are real.

This claim is not itself scientific. It cannot be tested, measured, or falsified. It is a philosophical assertion about the nature of reality. Yet it often goes unquestioned, shaping conclusions in advance of the data and excluding alternative explanations not because they have been disproven, but because they do not fit the prevailing paradigm.

Theories such as abiogenesis and macroevolution are sometimes treated as inevitable truths, even in the absence of direct empirical confirmation. This does not necessarily mean such theories are false. They may very well be correct, partially correct, or even incomplete in ways yet to be understood. But intellectual integrity demands that their status as unproven be acknowledged. As C. S. Lewis observed, “If [reductionism] is true, then this is also true: that all reasoning is invalid.” When such theories are treated as foregone conclusions rather than as open questions, the boundary between science and ideology becomes blurred.

Scientism as a Secular Dogma

This tendency can lead to a form of secular dogmatism. The assumption that all phenomena must ultimately have material explanations, regardless of whether such explanations are currently available, resembles the structure of religious fundamentalism. It begins with a non-negotiable premise and molds all inquiry to conform to it. Dissent is often not addressed with argument, but dismissed as ignorance, irrationality, or lack of scientific literacy.

Yet such rigidity is not consistent with the spirit of scientific inquiry, which thrives on open questions, falsifiability, and the willingness to revise assumptions in light of new evidence. When the conclusions of science are treated as unquestionable, even when evidence is lacking, the scientific method itself is undermined.

The Broader Scope of Reason

“The most incomprehensible thing about the universe is that it is comprehensible.” — Albert Einstein

The resolution to this problem is not to abandon science, but to recover a broader understanding of human reason. Science represents one powerful mode of inquiry, but it is not the only one. Philosophy, theology, ethics, and aesthetics also seek truth, often in areas that lie beyond the scope of empirical measurement. These domains are not opposed to science, but complementary. Each contributes to a fuller understanding of reality.

Questions concerning the origin, meaning, and purpose of life require not only empirical investigation, but metaphysical reflection. The rationality of the universe, the intelligibility of nature, and the presence of order and beauty invite deeper questions about whether the cosmos is the result of blind chance, necessity, or design. These are not unscientific questions; they are meta-scientific. They do not replace science, but direct it toward broader truths.

Moreover, the emergence of consciousness presents an especially difficult challenge for materialist accounts. Subjective experience, or qualia, cannot be reduced to chemical reactions or neural activity. While many functions of the brain can be mapped and measured, the fact of self-awareness remains unexplained. Philosopher David Bentley Hart notes, “No purely physical description of any kind can ever, even in principle, provide a complete or even adequate account of consciousness.” Attempts to reduce consciousness to physical processes often rely on philosophical commitments rather than empirical findings. This points to the need for an account of the human person that goes beyond materialism.

“No purely physical description of any kind can ever, even in principle, provide a complete or even adequate account of consciousness.” — David Bentley Hart

The intelligibility of the universe likewise raises important questions. The fact that nature operates according to consistent laws, and that the human mind is capable of understanding those laws, is not itself a product of science. It is a condition for the possibility of science. Albert Einstein remarked, “The most incomprehensible thing about the universe is that it is comprehensible.” The historical emergence of modern science occurred within a worldview that presupposed an ordered cosmos created by a rational mind. To now use science to exclude metaphysical explanations is to sever science from the very soil in which it first took root. As historian of science Stanley Jaki argued, “Science was born of Christianity. That is not a casual statement, but a historical fact.”

Finally, the reduction of human beings to mechanistic systems has moral implications. If all thoughts, desires, and decisions are ultimately the product of biochemical processes shaped by evolutionary pressure, then concepts such as free will, human dignity, and moral responsibility become difficult to defend. These ideas may persist socially or legally, but their philosophical grounding erodes under a purely materialist account of the person. Jürgen Habermas, though himself a secular philosopher, acknowledged, “Universalistic egalitarianism, from which sprang the ideas of freedom and social solidarity… is the direct legacy of the Judaic ethic of justice and the Christian ethic of love. Everything else is just postmodern chatter.” A worldview that claims to describe everything, yet cannot account for freedom, goodness, or beauty, ultimately describes too little.

Conclusion

Theories of evolution and abiogenesis may ultimately prove to be accurate descriptions of the natural world. Or they may prove incomplete. The critical point is not their truth or falsehood, but the importance of acknowledging the assumptions on which they rest. Scientific theories must be evaluated not only by their empirical content, but also by the philosophical commitments that shape their interpretation.

When science is practiced with humility, recognizing its limits and its dependence on deeper metaphysical principles, it remains a vital and trustworthy tool. But when it is used to justify claims that extend beyond its domain, it risks becoming a kind of ideology. To avoid this, it is necessary to distinguish clearly between what is known, what is inferred, and what is assumed. Only then can the pursuit of truth remain open, honest, and genuinely rational.

Works Cited

Bentley Hart, David. The Experience of God: Being, Consciousness, Bliss. Yale University Press, 2013.

Einstein, Albert. "Physics and Reality." Journal of the Franklin Institute, vol. 221, 1936, p. 349.

Habermas, Jürgen. Time of Transitions. Polity Press, 2006.

Jaki, Stanley L. The Savior of Science. Eerdmans Publishing, 2000.

Lewis, C. S. Miracles: A Preliminary Study. HarperOne, 2001 (originally published 1947).

Nagel, Thomas. The Last Word. Oxford University Press, 1997.